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OF THE SAME SEX 
52-U. Bait. L.F./26.3 
In Me Williams v. 
Fairfax County Board of Su-
pervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th 
Cir. 1996), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that hostile envi-
ronment claims of sexual ha-
rassment under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ("Title 
VII") cannot be sustained where 
both the alleged harasser and 
victim are heterosexuals of the 
same sex. In so holding, the 
court left open the possibility 
that sexual orientation could be 
both an element of and a de-
fense to sexual harassment 
claims. 
Plaintiff Mark 
McWilliams was employed by 
the Newington Facility of the 
Fairfax County Management 
Transportation Agency 
("EMT A") as an automotive 
mechanic. Beginning in 1989, 
Mc Williams was besieged by a 
variety of offensive conduct 
carried out by a group of his 
coworkers known as the "lube 
boys." The activities of the 
lube boys included teasing and 
physical assaults such as blind-
folding McWilliams, simulat-
ing oral sex, and fondling him. 
In addition, sex permeated the 
atmosphere at EMT A: copies 
of Playboy were displayed in 
the bathrooms; and centerfold 
pictures and off-color cartoons 
were circulated around the 
workplace. McWilliams com-
plained to his supervisors about 
some of these activities. In 
October 1992, McWilliams in-
formed EMT A management 
that he had been sexual I y abused 
and filed charges with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC"). 
In July of 1993, the 
EEOC issued aright-to-sue let-
ter. McWilliams then filed suit 
against the County and several 
supervisors in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia alleging 
workplace discrimination un-
der Title VII and violation of 
equal protection rights under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Be-
fore trial, the district court grant-
ed defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment concl uding that 
neither the County nor the su-
pervisors had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the conduct 
of the "lube boys." McWilliams 
appealed and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reviewed the dismissal 
de novo. 
The court began its anal-
ysis by rejecting Mc Williams's 
Title VII claim of sexual ha-
rassment. Me Williams v. 
Fairfax County Bd. ofSupervi-
sors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1194-95 
(4th Cir. 1996) (citing Title VII). 
Title VII condemns employer 
discrimination against an indi-
vidual "because of' the indi-
vidual's sex. Id. (citing Title 
VII). There are two types of 
sexual harassment claims un-
der Title VII: (1) quid pro quo 
harassment -- requiring sexual 
favors in exchange for benefits 
of employment, and (2) "sexu-
ally-oriented harassment by 
one's fellow employees suffi-
ciently egregious to create a 
'hostile workplace environ-
ment' that is knowingly tolerat-
ed by the employer." Id. at 
1195 (quoting Title VII) (em-
phasis added). Significantly, 
the court noted that 
McWilliams's claim involved 
only hostile environment ha-
rassment. McWilliams, 72F.3d 
at 1195. The elements of hos-
tile environment sexual harass-
ment are: (1) the conduct was 
unwelcome, (2) the harassment 
was based on the "sex" of the 
alleged victim, (3) the harass-
ment was "sufficiently perva-
sive or severe to create an abu-
sive working environment," and 
(4) there is some basis for "im-
puting liability to the employ-
er." Id. (citing Swentek v. 
USAIR, Inc., 830 F .2d 552, 557 
(4th Cir. 1987». 
Defendants claimed 
Mc Williams failed to prove that 
the defendants knew or should 
have known of the lube boys' 
conduct and, thus, there was no 
basis for imputing liability. 
McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195. 
The court, however, declined to 
address that issue and instead 
held that Mc Williams's hostile 
environment claim failed for 
"the more fundamental reason" 
that such claims cannot prevail 
where both the alleged harass-
ers and the alleged victim are 
the same sex and heterosexual. 
Id. In reaching this conclusion, 
the court analyzed the language 
of the statute. Id. at 1195-96. 
Specifically, the court exam-
ined the phrase "because of the 
[target's] 'sex'" and determined 
that same sex heterosexual con-
duct is beyond the scope of the 
statute. Id. 1195-96. The court 
also noted that to extend the 
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phrase to include such behavior 
would be to create 
"unmanageably broad protec-
tion ofthe sensibilities of work-
ers simply 'in matters of sex.'" 
Id. at 1196. The court acknowl-
edged that a law covering such 
conduct might be needed, but 
emphasized that Title VII was 
not the appropriate law. Id. 
The court similarly re-
j ected Mc Williams's equal pro-
tectionclaim under 42 U.S.c. § 
1983 for gender discrimination. 
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
The court concluded that such a 
claim under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 
was identical to a hostile work-
place claim under Title VII and 
therefore failed for the same 
reasons. Id. 
The court next rejected 
McWilliams's substantive due 
process claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. Id. at 1196-97 (citing 
42U.S.C. § 1983). McWilliams 
claimed that as a result of actual 
physical assaults he was de-
prived of his substantive due 
process rights under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. Id. at 1197 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 1983). The court first 
noted that, in determining lia-
bility under § 1983, principles 
of respondeat superior do not 
apply. Id. Since the defendants 
did not participate in the abuse, 
the only remaining potential for 
liability would be if culpability 
by tacit condonation could be 
shown. I d. at 1197. The court, 
however, rejected this possibil-
ity, finding that McWilliams 
failed to establish that either the 
county or any ofMc Williams's 
supervisors knew or should have 
known of the physical abuse. 
Id. at 1197-98. Finally, the 
court rejected McWilliams's 
claim that deficiencies in the 
county's training program 
amounted to "policy-as-effec-
tive-cause" because he failed to 
show that there was a direct 
causal link between the defi-
ciencies and the injuries he sus-
tained. Id. at 1198. 
In sum, the court of ap-
peals affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of 
McWilliams's claims. Id. The 
court held that hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims 
under Title VII and equal pro-
tection claims of gender dis-
crimination under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 cannot be sustained where 
the alleged harasser and victim 
are heterosexuals of the same 
sex. Id. 
In his dissent, Circuit 
Judge Michael criticized the 
majority for characterizing the 
defendants' actions as mere 
"meanness and horseplay." Id. 
Title VII is violated, the dissent 
asserted, whenever a person 
abuses a co-worker out of sex-
ual interest or desire. Id. This, 
the dissent maintained, could 
be established by the acts of the 
defendants. Id. While conced-
ingthat sexual orientation could 
be relevant to a charge of sexual 
harassment, the dissent argued 
that evidence of sexual orienta-
tion should not be required as 
an element of a Title VII claim. 
ld. The dissent expressed con-
cern that the majority holding 
will shift the focus in such cases 
to a pursuit of the '''true' sexual 
orientation" of the harasser, 
rather than an inquiry into what 
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occurred. Id 
In McWilliams v. 
Fairfax County Board of Su-
pervisors, the United States 
Court of Appeals for theF ourth 
Circuit held that hostile envi-
ronment claims of sexual ha-
rassment under Title VII can-
not be sustained where both the 
alleged harasser and victim are 
heterosexuals of the same sex. 
The court's holding effectively 
makes sexual orientation an el-
ement of a hostile-environment 
sexual harassment claim under 
Title VII. Although the court 
merely contemplated requiring 
a plaintiff to prove homosexu-
ality in same sex cases, the court 
54- U. Bait. L.F. /26.3 
left the door open for inquiry 
into sexual orientation in any 
sexual harassment case. This is 
troublesome be9ause, as the dis-
sent warns, the decision may 
shift the focus in sexual harass-
ment cases to pursuits of the 
defendants' true sexual orien-
tation. Also left open is the 
possibility that sexual orienta-
tion could become a defense to 
claims of sexual harassment. 
F or example, a man charged 
with sexually harassing a fe-
male co-worker may be able to 
raise homosexuality as a de-
fense. Moreover, while declar-
ing that harassing conduct of a 
sexual nature directed at same 
sex co-workers is insufficient 
to show actual sexual orienta-
tion, the court failed to provide 
the lower courts with a work-
able standard by which the low-
er court might determine wheth-
er a person is a homosexual. 
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